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This study aims to investigate the role of dividends in explaining debt 
pricing decision making. Using data from Thai listed companies spanning the 
period 2000 through 2016, results from a panel regression analysis indicate that 
there is no significant association between the cost of debt capital and dividend 
payouts. The inferences are unchanged even after using alternative 
measurements for dividends and excluding global financial crisis periods. This 
study contributes to the stream of research on dividend payout consequences by 
documenting that dividends do not provide incrementally useful information 
when there are a few agency conflicts of interests due to a dominant family-run 
business environment.   
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This paper aims to investigate the 
role of dividend payouts in explaining 
the cost of debt capital. Information 
asymmetry between firms’ 
managements and capital providers 
has been used in explaining the 
efficiency of capital allocation for 
decades (Loss, 1983; Loss and 
Seligman, 2001). In this vein, prior 
studies generally show that capital 
providers perceive information 
asymmetry as a source of risk and 
hence demand a higher cost of capital 
to compensate (Levitt, 1998; Lambert 
et al., 2012). In response to this, firms 
attempt to communicate to capital 
providers in multiple ways including 
dividend policy disclosure in order to 
balance the negative consequence to 
the cost of capital caused by 
information imperfection (Jensen, 
1986). Nonetheless, mounting 
evidence suggests that the association 
between dividends and the cost of 
debt capital could be more complex 
than the theoretical model, while it 
should be noted that the relationship 
also depends on the context (i.e. Glen 
et al., 1995; Jiang & Jiranyakul, 
2013). Even though this argument is 
of practical importance, previous 
studies have mainly focused on the 
consequence of dividend policy in 
capital markets. Motivated by the 
limited amount of evidence on 
whether dividend payouts affect the 
cost of debt capital, this research 
focusses on extending this stream of 
 
3 Aivazian et al. (2003) report that emerging country-level factors could drive dividend behavior 
and capital structure decision differently, compared to those developed market contexts.  
research in the context of the Thai 
market.  
Thai listed companies were used 
to form the empirical sample due to 
the unique characteristics of Thai 
corporate financing structure. The 
Thai debt market has been developed 
and utilized as a major source of 
domestic fund raising, yet the market 
is also considered a highly imperfect 
information environment, with 
limited alternative underlying assets 
(Alba et al., 999). In addition, Thai 
corporate ownership structure is 
generally formed by highly 
concentrated founding family 
ownerships (Fairchild et al., 2014) 3. 
Anderson et al. (2003) contend that a 
founding family ownership is most 
likely to have a low level of agency 
conflicts. This suggests that capital 
providers may consider agency 
problems to be less severe in family-
run businesses. Therefore, the Thai 
capital market provides a unique 
research setting for testing the general 
dividend policy and information 
asymmetry arguments in the prior 
literature. 
Using a panel OLS regression 
analysis method and data from Thai 
listed companies covering the period 
2000 - 2016, the insignificant 
relationship between dividends and 
the cost of debt capital is documented. 
This implies that dividend policies are 
not a significant consideration for 
debtholders in terms of debt pricing in 
the Thai market and supports the 
notion that the association between 
The Cost of Debt Capital and Dividend Payouts: Evidence from Thailand 
                   245 
the cost of debt and dividends is 
dependent on the setting. It is hereby 
postulated that debtholders view 
family-run businesses as less 
susceptible to agency conflicts 
(Anderson et al., 2003) and better 
corporate governance (Ibrahim & 
Samad, 2011; Mishra et al., 2001). 
Consequently, dividends do not 
provide incremental value to 
debtholders when making debt pricing 
decisions. These inferences are 
unchanged after sensitivity analysis 
using alternative proxies for dividends 
and excluding financial crisis periods 
(period of 2008 and 2009).  
This study contributes to this 
thread of research in multiple ways. 
Firstly, it enriches the evidence on the 
consequences of dividends on the cost 
of debt capital which is substantially 
limited. Secondly, the research 
extends prior evidence (i.e. Farooq, & 
Jabbouri, 2015) through the 
establishment of a data set from a 
market where the founding family 
ownership structure is dominant 
resulting in a low level of agency 
problems, thus providing evidence 
that the dividend consequence on 
borrowing cost is not theoretically 
explained, but rather practically 
explained by typical debt 
determinants. The strong implication 
is that debtholders in different regions 
might seek different financial 
indicators and therefore affect the 
relationship between dividend policy 
and borrowing costs.  
The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 
provides the institutional background 
for the Thai debt market. Section 3 
reports the literature review and 
hypothesis development, while 
Section 4 presents the research design 
including the sample description and 
deployment of empirical equations. 
Section 5 discusses the main results 
and sensitivity analysis. Section 6 
concludes the key findings of the 
study.  
 
2.    INSTITUTIONAL 
BACKGROUND OF THAI DEBT 
MARKET 
 
The Thai debt market is 
considered to be bank-oriented as 
banks are the main debt capital 
providers in the Thai debt market 
(bank lending represents 34%, ranked 
number 1 in debt market) (The Stock 
Exchange of Thailand, 2019). 
Commercial banks continue to 
maintain their profitability and high 
capital, consistently playing a key role 
in debt financing to Thai corporations, 
while various types of debt 
instruments are being developed.  The 
growth of the Thai debt market and 
the development of debt instruments 
emphasizes the importance of banks 
(creditors) in resource allocation in 
the Thai market. This also suggests 
that banks (creditors) require 
incremental information, not stated in 
financial statements such as 
information about monitoring 
mechanisms, to ensure that firms’ 
managements do not spend their 
firm’s excess cash flow on 
unprofitable projects (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986) which 
may impair the banks loan 
investment.  
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Besides this, the uniqueness of 
the debt market in Thailand’s 
economy is driven by family business 
(on average, 80% of companies on the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand are 
family-run companies) (PwC, 2019). 
Generally, a family-run business is 
most likely to establish a long-term 
strategic business plan as it has future 
generations in mind. For example, a 
family business with family members 
on the board tends to engage in 
hedging activities, eliminating 
unnecessary risks that could harm the 
firm’s value (Suehiro & Wailerdsak, 
2004). The evidence suggests that the 
dominant founding family ownership 
structure in Thailand perhaps 
enhances debtholders confidence in 
future debt collection and hence 
debtholders do not seek for dividend 
payouts as primary information in 
debt pricing decision making.  
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
This study stems from two 
literature threads: (i) reporting the role 
of dividend policy in enhancing the 
information environment and (ii) 
investigating the relationship between 
dividend payout and a firm’s cost of 
debt capital.  
 
3.1 Dividend Payout and 
Asymmetric Information 
 
Dividend policy and the quality 
of information environments for 
firms, have both been a puzzle in 
financial theory for quite some time 
(Li & Zhao, 2008). Allen and 
Michaely (2003) summarized the 
theoretical explanations for the 
dividend payout policy behaviors of 
firms reported by empirical studies. 
Among these explanations, their 
summary indicated that a change in 
payout policy seems to be made when 
firms have excess cash flow, 
preventing the firms’ managers from 
overinvestment. Consistent with this 
line of explanation regarding dividend 
policy and behavior, Grossman and 
Hart (1980) contend that dividend 
payout information can eliminate 
agency problems through the 
reduction of a firm’s excess cash flow, 
which may otherwise be spent on 
unprofitable projects. That is, the 
dividend payout information tends to 
provide relevant and incremental 
information to stakeholders about 
whether firms have an additional 
monitoring mechanism to reduce 
conflicts of interest among groups of 
stakeholders.  
The dominant strand of literature 
on dividend announcements suggests 
that firms are likely to establish 
dividend payout policy to signal the 
firm’s true worth and financial 
conditions to the market (Allen & 
Michaely, 2003; Farooq & Jabbori, 
2015). Under this line of theories, it is 
assumed that firms’ managements 
have more insightful information on 
the firms’ cash flow and value than 
outsiders, consequently using 
dividend payout information to 
communicate this to outsiders (John 
& Williams, 1985; Miller & Rock, 
1985). Miller and Rock (1985) also 
note that dividend announcements 
provide important predictive contents, 
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rather than just dividend dollar 
amounts in relation to current 
earnings. That is, the dividend acts as 
an additional piece of information, 
reflecting the firm’s current earnings 
and likely future performance, 
helping to mitigate the information 
gap problem between the 
management and other stakeholders.  
 
3.2 The Linkage between Dividend 
Payout and Cost of Debt Capital 
 
Whether the cost of debt capital 
is associated with a firm’s dividend 
policies is among the interesting 
issues in finance (Brigham & Gordon, 
1968). Yet, the relationship between 
the two variables seems to be 
inconclusive and this inconclusive 
relationship could be explained by 
two plausible perspectives. Firstly, 
dividend payouts can be viewed as an 
additional monitoring mechanism 
(Byun, 2007; Jabbouri & Attar, 2017). 
That is, dividend payouts limit 
management’s access to excess cash 
flow, preventing investment in 
unprofitable projects and resulting in 
better alignment to capital providers’ 
interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen, 1986). On the other hand, high 
dividend payouts can cause a low 
level of free cash flow, leading to a 
greater need for debt financing, and 
thus increasing additional financial 
risk (Farooq & Jabbouri, 2015). 
Therefore, the literature introduces 
empirical evidence on both sides of 
the argument.  
Given that dividend payouts can 
signal debt capital providers regarding 
the firm’s current earnings and 
prospects, higher dividend payouts 
can be interpreted as reflections of the 
firm’s confidence regarding future 
performance. In turn, creditors may 
assess the firm’s default risk to be 
lower than others and charge lower 
interest accordingly. Consistent with 
this signaling mechanism, Mathur et 
al. (2013) report that creditors view 
dividend payouts as conveying 
predictive information about the 
firms’ future financial conditions. As 
a result, the higher the dividend 
payouts, the lower the cost of debt 
capital incurred by the firm. 
Consistent with Mathur et al. (2013) 
findings, Farooq and Jabbouri (2015) 
showed that higher dividend payouts 
result in lower costs of debt capital for 
a firm. That is, higher dividends lead 
to lowering the cost required for 
raising debt capital for the firm 
(Bhattacharya, 1979; Ofer & Thakor, 
1987).  
Since dividend payouts may be 
viewed as an additional monitoring 
mechanism of corporate governance 
practice (Byun, 2007), this may lead 
to adjustments in the level of firm risk 
and financing cost as assessed by 
capital providers (Easterbrook, 1984). 
As noted previously, dividend payout 
limits management’s access to excess 
cash flow, preventing investment in 
unprofitable projects and resulting in 
better alignment with capital 
providers’ interests (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). In 
other words, dividend payout 
disclosure reveals information which 
provides additional monitoring on a 
firm’s cash flow, alleviating 
information asymmetry. By reducing 
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the possibility of investing in negative 
present value projects, dividend 
information helps creditors to be more 
certain about a firm profitability and 
default risk. Under this notion, Booth 
and Cleary (2003), and Byun (2007) 
empirically reported a negative 
association between the cost of debt 
capital and dividend payouts. Hence, 
grounded by the notion that dividend 
payments can be established as an 
additional corporate governance 
practice, it is expected that an inverse 
association exists between dividends 
and the cost of debt capital.  
However, the contradicting 
argument regarding the effect of 
dividends on the cost of debt capital 
does exist. High dividend payouts 
create conflicts between shareholders 
and debtholders (Easterbrook, 1984). 
In other words, shareholders may 
demand direct dividends and/or stock 
repurchases to prevent management 
from spending free cash flow on 
negative net present value projects, 
resulting in a reduction in the firm’s 
future cash flow. As a result, 
debtholders view firms with high 
dividends as having a high default 
risk, consequently charging a higher 
cost of debt capital. Additionally, the 
reduction of free cash flow according 
to dividend payments, may lead firms 
to engage with debt financing and 
therefore increase leverage risk and 
the financial cost incurred (Farooq & 
Jabbouri, 2015). Despite this 
argument appearing rational, Glen et 
al. (1995) point out that dividend 
policies and their consequences 
depend on the research context. For 
instance, dividend payment and its 
consequences in the U.S can be 
significantly different from those in 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (Jiang 
& Jiranyakul, 2013). That is, the 
association between the cost of debt 
capital and dividend payouts is more 
complex than generally argued, 
though the relationship between the 
two is shown in the mentioned 
studies. 
In addition to the complexity of 
the association between dividends and 
the cost of debt capital, attention 
should be paid to whether dividend 
payments are useful in practice for 
making decisions when there are few 
agency conflicts present. Naturally, 
privately-owned and operated 
companies have less severe agency 
problems than public companies 
(Maury, 2006). For instance, the 
management and majority 
shareholders of family-run firms are 
generally the same group of people; 
therefore, the interests of the 
management and shareholders are 
highly aligned. Neubauer and Lank 
(2016) also note that family firms are 
likely to make effective board 
meetings as they meet regularly, 
leading to succession planning and 
thus, stronger firm performance.  In 
most cases, these highly concentrated 
holdings constitute large proportions 
of the funding families’ net worth and 
are difficult to diversify. As a result, 
these companies tend to make 
operation and investment decisions 
from a more long-term perspective 
and have less incentive to take excess 
risk. Consequently, debtholders view 
such founding family ownership as an 
organizational structure which better 
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protects their interests (Anderson et 
al., 2003). In addition, the observed 
relationship between dividend policy 
and the cost of debt may be a result of 
the credit lending criteria adopted by 
local creditors. Banks operated in 
markets dominated by family 
businesses or when dividend payouts 
are generally undesirable (e.g. 
dividend tax-disadvantaged markets) 
may not include dividend policy in 
their credit assessment procedures. 
Therefore, when the level of agency 
problems is low, dividends may not be 
an essential piece of decisive 
information to debtholders regarding 
debt pricing. 
Altogether, the theories introduce 
the complexity of the relationship 
between dividends and the cost of 
debts. Besides this, the literature also 
suggests that when there are few 
conflicts of interest among 
stakeholders, dividends do not appear 
to be an essential piece of information 
in debt pricing. In Thailand, where the 
founding family ownership structure 
is dominant (about 80% of all 
businesses are family-run businesses), 
resulting in a low level of conflicts of 
interest among stakeholders and a 
more long-term focused environment, 
the established strategies are about the 
next generations’ wealth, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of taking 
unnecessary risks to boost short-term 
performance (Cracknell, 2019; 
Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). In turn, in 
the Thai context where a family run 
environment offers low agency 
problems and a better corporate 
governance environment, it is of 
academic and practical interest to 
determine if dividends are useful for 
decision making regarding debt 
pricing. Hence, the primary 
hypothesis is: 
Null Hypothesis: For firms with 
high ownership concentration, the 
cost of debt capital reported by firms 
with a high dividend payout ratio is 
not different from the cost paid by 
firms with a low dividend payout 
ratio.  
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
DATA 
 
4.1 Data and Sample 
 
The population for this study 
consisted of all companies listed in the 
Thai Stock Exchange excluding the 
banking industry; of this population a 
sample cross-section containing 456 
firms was used for data collection. 
The required data were obtained 
through the Thomson Reuters-
DataStream. The data used in the 
analysis covered a period of 16 years, 
from 2000 through 2016. As a result, 
the initial firm-year observations 
included a total of 7,752 observations. 
Observations with missing data were 
then dropped, leading to a final 
sample consisting of 4,043 firm-year 
observations.  
 
4.2 Regression Model 
 
Following research regarding 
dividends and the cost of debt capital, 
including the cost of determinant 
research, the following cost of debt 
model was used to test the null 
hypothesis: 
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All variables used in the study are 
defined in Appendix A.  
A panel regression analysis was 
used to regress the cost of debt capital 
(INTRATE) on DP (Dividend 
Payouts) and included multiple 
identified determinants for the cost of 
debt capital. INTRATE was measured 
by dividing the reported interest 
expense by the average of the 
beginning and ending debt levels (Al-
Hadi et al., 2017; Gul et al., 2013; 
Minnis, 2011). DP expresses the 
dividend payout ratio estimated by 
yearly dividends divided by net 
operating income, following previous 
studies (i.e. Amidu & Abor, 2006; 
Lloyd et al., 1985). The null 
hypothesis predicts no association 
between INTRATE and DP.  
Several control variables related 
to the cost of debt financing were 
included, following previous research 
(Demerjian et al., 2016; Magnan et al., 
2016; Minnis, 2011). SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the market value 
equity of a firm, a negative coefficient 
was expected for SIZE (Magnan et al., 
2016). GROWTH represents the 
revenue growth of the firm; the 
associated prediction is unclear as 
growth of a firm can pose investment 
risks, while it can also be viewed as a 
firm with a high growth opportunity 
(Al-Hadi et al., 2017). PROFIT is a 
proxy for a firm’s profitability and a 
negative coefficient on PROFIT is 
expected. COLASSSET is the capital 
intensity measured as the total 
carrying value properties scaled by 
total assets. A negative coefficient is 
predicted for COLASSET, as firms 
with larger underlying assets are less 
risky and hence, charge lower 
borrowing costs (Bwembya, 2009). 
WORKCAP refers to working capital, 
measured as the ratio of current assets 
to current liabilities, and is included in 
the model, as firms with higher 
liquidity are likely to be perceived as 
less risky (Demerjian et al., 2016). 
However, liquidity position is one 
aspect used for the assessment of 
default risk by debtholders and may 
not be very reliable when liquidity 
arising from the current asset value is 
not at the optimal level. When such 
circumstances appear, debtholders 
may prefer to focus on the operating 
cash flow generated by such assets 
(Soenen, 1993), thereby viewing 
improper working capital 
management as a risk factor when 
financing borrowing firms. Thus, a 
negative (positive) coefficient for 
WORKCAP is expected. Firm 
leverage (SOLVEN), measured as the 
ratio of total debt to total assets, 
captures the firm’s capital structure. 
Some argue that financial risk 
increases with an increase in firm 
leverage (Minnis, 2011), while others 
argue that family-run firms could 
move toward an optimal debt ratio 
causing no marginal financial risk 
(Kim & Sorensen, 1986). In other 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
+𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
+ 𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   
+𝛽𝛽6𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
+𝛽𝛽8𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽9𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
+𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀_𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 + 𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
(1) 
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words, the coefficient on SOLVEN 
could be either positive or negative, 
depending on whether the respective 
firm has reached its target leverage. 
INTCOV is defined as the earnings 
before interest and taxes divided by 
the interest expense for the related 
fiscal year; it captures a firm’s ability 
to pay its financial costs. The greater 
the interest coverage, the more 
capable the firm will be of paying its 
interest expenses, a negative 
coefficient is therefore expected for 
the INTCOV variable (Pittman & 
Fortin, 2004). Operating risk 
(OPRISK) is the three-year rolling 
standard deviation of PROFIT, 
capturing the volatility of a firm’s 
performance; a positive coefficient for 
OPRISK is therefore predicted. 
 
5. THE COST OF DEBT CAPITAL 
AND DIVIDEND PAYOUTS  
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in the 
empirical testing. In Panel A, the 
descriptive statistics for the final 
sample of 4,043 firm-year 
observations involving 456 firms 
show that the average interest rate 
(INTRATE) paid by Thai listed 
companies is 0.052. The dividend 
payout (DP) is around 0.464 and the 
dividend yield (DY) is about 0.036. 
Surprisingly, the mean value of 
SOLVEN is only 0.26, suggesting a 
relatively low level of debt for the 
average firm in Thailand during the 
sample period. The mean value of 
COLASSSET is 0.379, while the mean 
value of WORKCAP is 1.98. The 
average firm’s capability to meet 
interest payments (INTCOV) is about 
76 times, indicating that the firms 
have good faith. Concerning the 
firms’ profitability, the mean value of 
PROFIT is 0.098, with a mean value 
of GROWTH at 0.084.  
To understand whether firms 
with dividends payments, differ from 
those without dividend payments, the 
sample was split using DIV, a binary 
variable, taking a value of one when 
DP is positive, and zero otherwise. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the 
descriptive statistics of variables from 
the sample in which DIV = 1, while 
Panel C reports the descriptive 
statistics of variables from the sample 
in which DIV = 0. INTRATE in Panel 
B is 5.0%, while the mean value of 
INTRATE in Panel C is 5.7%. 
INTCOV in Panel B is 87 times, while 
the mean value of INTCOV in Panel C 
is 38 times. SOLVEN in Panel B is 
0.235, while the mean value of 
SOLVEN in Panel C is 0.342. 
WORKCAP in Panel B is 2.019, while 
the mean value of WORKCAP in 
Panel C is 1.839. The mean value of 
PROFIT in Panel B is 0.106, while the 
mean value of PROFIT in Panel C is 
0.068. It was observed that the mean 
value of OPRISK in Panel B is 0.773, 
which is lower than the mean value of 
OPRISK (1.376) in Panel C.  
Tests for the equality of the 
means between the two subsamples 
were conducted, indicating that there 
was no significant difference in the 
mean  values  for   COLASSSET,   but 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Final Sample 
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. S.D. Obs. 
Panel A: All variables        
INTRATE 0.052 0.048 0.013 0.124 0.027 4,043 
DP 0.464 0.389 0.000 1.614 0.439 4,043 
DY 0.036 0.033 0.000 0.103 0.031 4,043 
SIZE 14.831 14.634 12.260 18.223 1.623 4,043 
GROWTH 0.084 0.075 -0.264 0.496 0.185 4,043 
PROFIT 0.098 0.087 0.017 0.232 0.059 4,043 
COLASSET 0.379 0.377 0.038 0.779 0.219 4,043 
WORKCAP 1.979 1.479 0.512 6.027 1.428 4,043 
SOLVEN 0.259 0.248 0.001 0.601 0.188 4,043 
INTCOV 76.015 8.713 1.167 782.579 187.042 4,043 
OPRISK 0.907 0.920 -0.789 2.572 0.895 4,043 
Panel B: DIV=1       
INTRATE 0.050 0.046 0.013 0.124 0.027 3,147 
DP 0.596 0.493 0.000 1.614 0.411 3,147 
DY 0.046 0.042 0.000 0.103 0.028 3,147 
SIZE 15.040 14.837 12.260 18.223 1.605 3,147 
GROWTH 0.080 0.074 -0.264 0.496 0.173 3,147 
PROFIT 0.106 0.096 0.017 0.232 0.058 3,147 
COLASSET 0.379 0.377 0.038 0.779 0.217 3,147 
WORKCAP 2.019 1.535 0.512 6.027 1.403 3,147 
SOLVEN 0.235 0.223 0.001 0.601 0.178 3,147 
INTCOV 86.662 11.204 1.167 782.579 197.122 3,147 
OPRISK 0.773 0.803 -0.789 2.572 0.847 3,147 
Panel C: DIV=0       
INTRATE 0.057 0.055 0.013 0.124 0.026 896 
DP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 896 
DY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 896 
SIZE 14.097 13.876 12.260 18.223 1.466 896 
GROWTH 0.100 0.084 -0.264 0.496 0.220 896 
PROFITABILITY 0.068 0.054 0.017 0.232 0.052 896 
COLASSETS 0.376 0.381 0.038 0.779 0.227 896 
WORKCAP 1.839 1.266 0.512 6.027 1.505 896 
SOLVEN 0.342 0.353 0.001 0.601 0.196 896 
INTCOV 38.620 3.137 1.167 782.579 140.044 896 
OPRISK 1.376 1.424 -0.789 2.572 0.901 896 
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there were significant differences in 
the mean values for INTRATE, SIZE, 
GROWTH, PROFIT, COLASSET, 
WORKCAP, SOLVEN, INTCOV and 
OPRISK. Firms with dividend 
payments have higher WORKCAP, 
PROFIT, and INTCOV than firms 
without dividend payments. Firms 
without dividend payments have 
higher SOLVEN, INTRATE, 
GROWTH, and OPRISK than firms 
with dividend payments. 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the 
summary statistics for the final 
sample.  Panel B  of  this table reports 
the summary statistics of the key 
variables for the sample group 
classified as positive for dividend 
payments (DIV is measured as one for 
businesses making dividend 
payments, while it is zero for all other 
businesses, forming an alternative 
proxy for the dividend payout ratio as 
an additional test). Panel C reports the 
summary statistics of the key 
variables for the sample group 
classified as negative for dividend 
payments and assigned to the Zero 
DIV category. All variables used in 
this study are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Table 2: Dividend Payout Ratio Sorted by Mean Value Classified by TRBC 
Business Sector 
Group 
Number Sector Name Mean Median Max Min. S.D. Obs. 
5620 Pharmaceuticals & 
Medical Research 
0.705 0.510 1.356 0.443 0.435 4 
5720 Software & IT Services 0.657 0.662 1.614 0.000 0.459 76 
5330 Cyclical Consumer 
Services 
0.612 0.575 1.614 0.000 0.478 374 
5910 Utilities 0.587 0.535 1.614 0.000 0.367 114 
5210 Industrial Goods 0.569 0.452 1.614 0.000 0.518 188 
5410 Food & Beverages 0.540 0.481 1.614 0.000 0.409 365 
5810 Telecommunications 
Services 
0.504 0.377 1.614 0.000 0.525 113 
5320 Cyclical Consumer 
Products 
0.489 0.406 1.614 0.000 0.471 359 
5710 Technology Equipment 0.479 0.346 1.614 0.000 0.458 122 
5340 Retailers 0.477 0.406 1.614 0.000 0.398 179 
5230 Industrial 
Conglomerates 
0.471 0.445 1.614 0.000 0.287 33 
5430 Food & Drug Retailing 0.462 0.389 1.138 0.000 0.279 38 
5130 Applied Resources 0.450 0.398 1.614 0.000 0.433 182 
5420 Personal & Household 
Products & Services 
0.449 0.454 1.614 0.000 0.326 32 
5010 Energy - Fossil Fuels 0.446 0.369 1.614 0.000 0.398 170 
5110 Chemicals 0.427 0.355 1.614 0.000 0.399 216 
Napaporn Likitwongkajon and Pinprapa Sangchan 
254 
Table 2: Dividend Payout Ratio Sorted by Mean Value Classified by TRBC 
Business Sector (Continued) 
Group 
Number Sector Name Mean Median Max Min. S.D. Obs. 
5310 Automobiles & Auto 
Parts 
0.425 0.313 1.614 0.000 0.422 163 
5610 Healthcare Services & 
Equipment 
0.423 0.423 1.614 0.000 0.285 178 
5240 Transportation 0.377 0.308 1.614 0.000 0.399 123 
5540 Real Estate 0.366 0.295 1.614 0.000 0.403 357 
5120 Mineral Resources 0.361 0.161 1.614 0.000 0.465 353 
5220 Industrial & 
Commercial Services 
0.347 0.203 1.614 0.000 0.433 289 
5020 Renewable Energy 0.105 0.000 0.729 0.000 0.242 15 
Overall mean value of the final 
sample 0.464 0.389 1.614 0.000 0.439 4,043 
 
Table 2 demonstrates the 
dividend payments sorted by the mean 
value of the relevant sector, as 
classified by The Thomson Reuters 
Business Classification (hereafter, 
TRBC). According to Table 2, the 
largest sector is Pharmaceutical and 
Medical Research with a mean value 
of 0.705. Software and IT Services, 
Cyclical Consumer Services, Utilities, 
Industrial Goods, Food and 
Beverages, Telecommunications 
Services, Cyclical Consumer 
Products, Technology Equipment, 
Retailers, and Industrial 
Conglomerates, all have a mean value 
of DP higher than the mean value of 
the total sample. The lowest mean 
value for DP is reported by firms 
classified in the sector of Renewable 
Energy.  
Table 3 reports the results from 
the matrix correlation metric analysis. 
It was found that the correlations 
between the explanatory variables 
were very low with the highest 
correlation value being 0.30. 
Therefore, there are no concerns about 
a multicollinearity problem and all 
variables were used in the regression 
analysis. Without considering the 
typical cost of debt determinants, the 
analysis shows that the correlation 
coefficients of DP and DY are 
negatively associated with statical 
significance, while the cost of debt 
capital suggests an inverse 
relationship supporting the arguments 
for signaling and corporate 
governance practice. However, as 
previously discussed, the association 
between dividends and interest 
expenses is too complex to make a 
clear conclusion while overlooking 
typical debt pricing factors. The 
correlation coefficients of SIZE, 
COLASSET, SOLVEN, and INTCOV 
were found to have a statistically 
significant negative association with 
the cost of debt capital, while those of 
PROFIT, WORKCAP, and OPRISK 
were found to have a statistically 
significant positive association with 
the cost of debt capital. 
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix  
 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the variables for the total sample of 4,043 firm-year observations. 
Symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. See Appendix A for 
variable definitions.  
 
                      
VARIABLES INTRATE DP DY PROFIT SIZE GROWTH COLASSET WORKCAP SOLVEN INTCOV OPRISK 
INTRATE 1.00 
          
            
DP -0.03** 1.00             
DY -0.04** 0.68*** 1.00             
PROFIT 0.10*** 0.00 0.27*** 1.00             
SIZE -0.10*** 0.10*** -0.01 0.26*** 1.00             
GROWTH 0.02 -0.20*** -0.11 0.15*** 0.07*** 1.00             
COLASSET -0.05*** -0.03** -0.06 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 1.00             
WORKCAP 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.13*** 0.14*** -0.08 -0.10*** -0.30*** 1.00             
SOLVEN -0.21*** -0.16*** -0.24*** -0.28*** 0.08 0.08*** 0.15*** -0.46*** 1.00             
INTCOV -0.05** 0.06*** 0.14*** -0.28*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.16*** 0.42 -0.46*** 1.00             
OPRISK 0.13*** -0.12*** -0.14*** 0.10*** -0.11* 0.05*** -0.02 0.06*** 0.02 -0.02 1.00             
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5.2 Results of Panel OLS 
Regressions 
 
Table 4 presents the panel OLS 
regression results for the effect of 
dividend payouts on the cost of debt 
capital. The dependent variable in 
Columns (1) to (4) is the cost of debt 
capital (INTRATE) which is computed 
as the interest expense divided by the 
average of the beginning and ending 
debt levels. The interest independent 
variable in Column (2) reports the 
effect of DP, the variable of interest, 
on INTRATE. Column (3) 
demonstrates the effect of DY on the 
cost of debt capital; these results form 
a robust test, through the use of an 
alternative proxy (DY) for dividend 
payments. Column (4) shows the 
findings from the robust test, the use 
of an alternative measurement (DIV) 
for dividend payments. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level.  
Column (1) of Table 4 presents 
the results of the baseline regression 
for the common cost of debt 
determinants in the Thai market. 
Findings are consistent with prior 
studies. GROWTH is positively 
associated with INTRATE (coefficient 
= 0.00, p < 0.01) implying that growth 
firms report comparatively higher 
interest expenses. This could be 
explained by the empirical evidence 
that when external capital is needed 
for business expansion, and there is no 
concern over debt capacity, debt 
financing is preferred by the 
corporation, resulting in a large 
amount of debt and accordingly 
higher interest expenses (Lemmon & 
Zender, 2010). As previously 
discussed, it is noted that the 
relationship between WORKCAP and 
the debt of capital can be explained by 
the working capital management 
efficiency argument or solvency 
argument. The positive correlation 
observed supports the working capital 
management efficiency argument. 
However, it should be emphasized 
that even though the relationship is 
statistically significant, the economic 
impact is small (coefficient = 0.00, p 
< 0.01). 
SIZE was found to have a 
significant inverse relationship with 
INTRATE (coefficient = - 0.00, p-
value < 0.10) suggesting that 
debtholders view larger firms as less 
risky, thereby charging lower 
financial costs (Magnan et al., 2016). 
Firms having a larger amount of 
collateral assets paid lower borrowing 
costs (Bwembya, 2009), as the 
coefficient of COLASSET is 
significantly and negatively 
associated with cost of debt 
(coefficient = - 0.02, p < 0.01). 
Consistent with the prior literature, 
INTCOV is negatively related with the 
cost of debt (coefficient = - 0.01, p < 
0.01), suggesting that a high ability to 
pay interest obligations, and low cost 
of debt is required. Interestingly, 
leverage level (SOLVEN) is 
negatively associated with the cost of 
debt (coefficient = -0.06, p < 0.01). 
This is perhaps because the majority 
of family-run firms are trying to move 
toward a target debt ratio causing no 
marginal financial risk; instead, 
debtholders prefer to be insiders (Kim 
& Sorensen, 1986). As a result, a low 
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cost of debt is described.  
To test the null Hypothesis, DP, 
the ratio of dividends to net operating 
income was added in column (2). DP 
was then replaced with DY, the ratio 
of dividends to the market value of 
equity, in column (3), to test whether 
variation in dividends paid is 
associated with the cost of debt. 
Finally, DP was replaced with DIV, a 
binary variable, taking a value of one 
when dividends are positive, and zero 
otherwise, in column (4). The results 
in Table 4 (column 2) demonstrate the 
report findings for the primary 
hypothesis which states that there is 
no relationship between dividends and 
the  cost  of debt capital  in   the  Thai 
 
Table 4: The Effect of Dividend Payouts on the Cost of Debt Capital 
This table presents the panel OLS regression results for the effect of dividend 
payouts on the cost of debt capital. The dependent variable is INTRATE. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Variable definitions are presented 












DP   0.00 0.62     
DY     0.01 0.63   
DIV       -0.001 0.658 
GROWTH -0.00** 0.065 -0.00* 0.060 -0.00* 0.068 -0.00* 0.076 
PROFIT       0.11*** 0.000 0.12*** 0.000 0.11*** 0.000 0.11*** 0.000 
GROWTH 0.01*** 0.000 0.09*** 0.000 0.09*** 0.000 0.08*** 0.000 
COLASSET -0.01*** 0.001 -0.02*** 0.001 -0.02*** 0.001 -0.02*** 0.001 
WORKCAP 0.00*** 0.000 0.00*** 0.000 0.00*** 0.000 0.00*** 0.000 
SOLVEN -0.06*** 0.000 -0.06*** 0.000 -0.06*** 0.000 -0.06*** 0.000 
INTCOV -0.01*** 0.000 -0.01*** 0.000 -0.01*** 0.000 -0.08*** 0.000 









Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
R2 0.527  0.527  0.527  0.527 
 
Adjusted R2 0.464  0.464  0.464  0.464 
 
F-Stat 8.296  8.278  8.278  8.278 
 
P-value of F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
Firm-




4,043  4,043  4,043 
 
Note: Symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
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setting. As expected, the coefficient of 
DP is positive and insignificantly 
related to the cost of debt (coefficient 
= 0.00 and non-statistically significant 
t-stat). The results therefore imply that 
the dividend payout ratio is neither a 
good signal of corporate governance 
practice, nor a piece of information 
regarding firms’ cash flow 
limitations.  
To test whether the findings are 
sensitive to the choice of proxies for 
the dividend payments, the main 
findings were reassessed by re-
running equation (1) using the 
alternative variables of DY, the ratio 
of dividends to the market value of 
equity; and DIV, a dummy variable 
measured as one if dividends were 
positive and zero otherwise. Column 
(3) and Column (4) in Table 4 show 
that there is an insignificant 
relationship with the cost of debt for 
both DY and DIV (coefficient = 0.09, 
insignificant t-statistic, coefficient = -
0.00, insignificant t-statistic). The 
findings from the sensitivity analyses 
therefore report consistent results with 
the main test results. Thus, the 
inferences support the null 
hypothesis.   
One plausible explanation for the 
findings of an insignificant 
relationship between the dividend 
payout ratio and cost of debt capital, 
is the fact that the Thai market is 
dominated by family-run businesses. 
Family-run businesses seem to have 
inherently low agency problems, 
compared to non-family run 
companies where ownership is spread 
widely among the public, meaning 
that additional monitoring through the 
dividend payout ratio is not as 
relevant. Consequently, debtholders 
view family-run business as a 
favorable organizational structure, 
better protecting their interests and 
having less long-term accruals 
discretion (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 
2003; Neubauer & Lank, 2016; Setia-
Atmaja, Haman, & Tanewski, 2011). 
In terms of control variables, the 
inferences are consistent with the 
previous discussion. 
 
5.3 Additional analyses 
 
5.3.1 Levels of financial leverage 
This section examines whether 
the level of financial leverage 
(SOLVEN) affects the effects of 
dividend payouts on the cost of debt 
for Thai firms, as the financial 
leverage level may potentially alter 
the debtholders’ behavior (due to, e.g. 
firm credit risk). The main OLS 
estimation was repeated for two 
subsamples: (1) firms with higher 
financial leverage, and (2) firms with 
lower financial leverage. To conserve 
space, the results are not tabulated, but 
are discussed in detail below. The 
sample of firms with higher financial 
leverage was analyzed first (SOLVEN 
> = the mean value of SOLVEN), 
followed by the sample of firms with 
lower financial leverage (SOLVEN < 
the mean value of SOLVEN). 
Consistent with the results shown in 
Table 4, it was found that the 
coefficient of dividends variable was 
still statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that the level of financial 
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leverage does not affect the effect of 
dividend payouts on the cost of debt 
for Thai firms. Consistent with the 
results in Table 4, there is still a 
positive and insignificant effect of 
dividend payouts on the cost of debt 
for the subsample of firms with lower 
financial leverage. In addition, it was 
found that for the subsample of firms 
with higher financial leverage, there 
was a negative but insignificant effect 
of dividend payouts on the cost of 
debt. 
 
5.3.2 Levels of free float 
This section examines whether 
the level of free float affects the effect 
of dividend payouts on the cost debt 
among Thai firms, as the ownership 
structure may potentially alter 
debtholders’ behavior (due to, e.g. 
family-run business). The main OLS 
estimation was repeated for two 
subsamples: (1) the firms with higher 
free float, and (2) the firms with lower 
free float. To conserve space, the 
results are not tabulated, but are 
discussed below. The sample of firms 
with higher free float were first 
analyzed (free float >= the mean value 
of free float), followed by the sample 
of firms with a lower free float (free 
float < the mean value of free float). 
Consistent with the results shown in 
Table 4, it was found that the 
coefficients of dividends variable was 
still statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that the level of free float 
does not affect the effect of dividend 
payouts on the cost of debt among 
Thai firms. Consistent with the results 
in Table 4, there was still a positive 
and insignificant effect of dividend 
payouts on the cost of debt for the 
subsample of firms with higher free 
float. In addition, it was found that for 
the subsample of firms with lower free 
float there was a negative and 
insignificant effect of dividend 
payouts on the cost of debt. 
 
6. CONCLUSION  
 
Motivated by the complexity of 
the relationship between dividends 
and the cost of debt, and the limited 
amount of evidence on this matter, 
this study investigated the association 
between dividends and the cost of 
debt capital. Thai listed companies 
were selected as the empirical 
population due to the unique 
characteristics of the common 
ownership structure and the 
development of the Thai debt market. 
Using this unique set of data, covering 
the period from 2000 through 2016, it 
was expected to find an alternative 
implication of the effect of dividends 
on debt financing cost. As expected, 
the findings showed that the 
relationship between dividend 
payouts and the cost of debt capital is 
insignificant. The results suggest that 
the association of these two variables 
is dependent on the context. Markets 
in different regions could be driven by 
different behavior and culture 
resulting in different levels of 
usefulness regarding dividend 
information in debt financing 
decisions. However, this was not 
examined in the study. Therefore, this 
research not only enriches the 
literature regarding the effect of 
dividends on the cost of debt, but also 
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indirectly offers evidence regarding 
the positive side of family-run 
businesses, specifically their 
improved corporate governance and 
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INTRATE is measured by dividing the reported interest expense by the 
average of the beginning and ending debt levels. 
DP is the ratio of dividends to net operating income. 
DY is the ratio of dividends to the market value of equity. 
DIV is measured as a binary variable, taking a value of one when 
dividends are positive, and zero otherwise.  
PROFIT is the ratio of the net operating income to total operating 
assets 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. 
GROWTH captures the growth of revenue, measured as the first 
difference in the natural logarithm of a firm’s net sales. 
COLASSET is defined as the ratio of property, plant, and equipment, to 
total assets.  
WORKCAP represents a firm’s liquidity and is estimated as the ratio of 
current assets to current liabilities. 
SOLVEN captures financial risk, and is measured as the ratio of total 
debt to total assets. 
INTCOV  is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to 
interest expense. 
OPRISK  is the natural logarithm of the three-year rolling standard 
deviation of ROA. 
FIRM_FE proxy for firm fixed effect.  
YEAR_FE captures yearly fixed effect. 
 
 
